



Reach Higher Ground



# FCC Reclassification NOI

## Economic Impact Assessment

Prepared for: 



- Executive Summary
- Cable Business Case
- FTTH Business Case
- Regulatory Impact



## This study examines the impact of prospective FCC regulation on future investment in broadband access networks

- The FCC has issued a Notice of Inquiry (NoI), seeking comment on options for the future regulation of broadband Internet services
  - Options include the extension of telephony regulation hitherto not applied to these services
  - New obligations have the potential to increase operator costs and reduce revenues
- Operators considering network investments will generally use a business case model to determine whether new investments are financially viable
  - Projects which are unprofitable or generate insufficient returns will not receive commercial funding
  - Projects which require public funding will require greater subsidy if the economics are impaired
- This study assesses the impact of prospective FCC regulation on two operator investment decisions using high-level financial models
  - A cable operator considering a new cable build
  - A wireline telecom operator considering an FTTH overbuild of its existing territory
- For each investment case we calculate the expected outcome under the current regulatory environment, and examine how that would change should additional obligations be introduced as a result of the NoI
- We evaluate a range of markets to illustrate areas where the economics will be most impacted
- We would expect results to be directionally similar for all new investments in broadband access networks including, for example, FTTC/VDSL deployment



## To assess the economic implications of increased regulation we quantified the impact of a subset of potential obligations and applied these to the business case models

- Obligations were grouped into two levels based upon the likelihood of implementation based on input from TIA
  - Potential obligations explicitly considered by the FCC in the Nol
  - Obligations disclaimed by the current FCC chairman but potentially resulting from reclassification
- To illustrate the economic implications of expanded regulation we selected a subset of obligations from each level that could be modeled in a straightforward and transparent manner using high-level assumptions
  - Some were modeled as increasing operator costs, for example in administration and customer care
  - Others impacted revenues, for example retail price regulation or an obligation to resell or unbundle services
- We did not attempt to quantify the impact of every obligation that could arise through reclassification
  - Effects such as increased product development costs, delays in time-to-market for new services, heightened regulatory uncertainty and consequent impact on risk premium were not included
  - As such, the true cost of regulation for industry could be higher than our findings suggest



## Our analysis demonstrates that an increased regulatory burden impairs the commercial case for network investment

- Using business case models we calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of network investments under different regulatory conditions
  - An investment with a positive NPV is profitable while a negative NPV represents a loss above a hurdle rate of return
- In every case, increasing the degree of regulation reduces the NPV of an investment
- Scenarios that are profitable under base case conditions become loss-making when new obligations are added
  - For the cable investment, the value of the investment in our example rural town falls from a positive NPV of \$7.2M to a negative NPV of -\$11.5M when all obligations were applied
  - For the FTTH deployment in the urban town the NPV falls from \$7.4M to negative -\$8.6M
- New regulation may therefore constrain investment in network infrastructure
  - The projects represent significant infrastructure investment: cumulative CapEx of \$34M in the new cable overbuild and \$22M in the FTTH overbuild over 10 years
  - Each model analyses the impact of regulation on two example cities or towns; extending these effects to the nation would suggest substantial negative impacts
- The greatest economic impacts result from obligations to resell or unbundle the network
  - While the resale and unbundle obligations may not be central to the FCC's policy aims, there is a risk that they could be subsequently introduced if reclassification proceeds
  - As such, any future investment would need to factor in the risk of these obligations being brought in, for example by increasing the discount rate in the business case
- Regulatory uncertainty may itself be a sufficient barrier to investment in many cases, and is not quantified in this study



## A second consequence of the increased regulatory burden is to increase the required level of any universal service subsidy that could be awarded

- We model network investments in less populated areas where typically there is insufficient end-user revenue to cover the high cost to serve
  - The base case of these investments have negative NPVs, i.e. they are loss making and would not normally attract commercial investment without public subsidy
- Depending on structure of a broadband support mechanism, deployment in some of these areas might benefit from USF support
  - This study does not seek to quantify USF support payments or speculate as to how this may be disbursed
  - However, to make a loss-making network investment attractive, the USF support would need to at least match the negative NPV
- Even if the new regulatory approach would permit USF funding for broadband deployments, our analysis indicates that other aspects of the approach would substantially increase the funding requirement
  - The NPVs of the loss-making scenarios become more negative when additional regulation is imposed e.g. the negative NPV for cable in the rural area scenario increases from  $-\$8.2\text{M}$  to  $-\$15.7\text{M}$  (an increase of 91%)
  - Consequently, reclassification undercuts the business case for deployment, such that substantial support will be needed merely to bring the NPV to the point it was at under the current framework; still more support would be needed to overcome pre-existing deficit and attract investment
  - Of course, many projects - likely including those analyzed here - would not receive any high-cost support even under a proposed new regulatory approach
- In summary, the potential regulations stemming from reclassification may work at cross-purposes with FCC initiatives seeking to target USF funds to rural areas to support new broadband investment
- Reclassification is therefore an economically inefficient means of achieving universal service goals



# The FCC is seeking comment on options for the future regulation of Broadband Internet Services; three options are set out in its Notice of Inquiry

## Option 1: Retain Title I

- Maintain the current classification of wired broadband Internet service as a unitary information service
- FCC would rely primarily on its ancillary authority to implement the Commission's broadband policies
- However D.C. Circuit rejected the Commission's theory of ancillary authority in Comcast
- Question therefore as to whether the Commission can accomplish its goals within this framework

## Option 2: Adopt Full Title II

- Reclassify broadband Internet connectivity as a telecommunications service subject to Title II provisions
- FCC would hold express authority to implement rules furthering its goals
- Concern that this would result in overregulation of a service that has so far undergone rapid and generally beneficial development
- May therefore not be consistent with Commission goals of promoting innovation and investment in broadband

## Option 3: Partial Title II

- Classify wired broadband Internet connectivity as a telecommunications service (as per Option 2)
- Simultaneously forbear from applying most requirements of Title II, other than those required to achieve stated policy goals

***The impact of  
Option 3 is the  
focus of this study***

The NOI positions the “third way” as enabling the FCC to achieve broadband policy goals without subjecting broadband to the full burden of Title II regulation



We have assessed the economic impact of regulation stemming from Option 3, “the third way”; potential obligations have been categorized in two tiers for analysis

### Assessment of Economic Impact to Operators

#### Option 3: Partial Title II

- Classify wired broadband Internet connectivity as a telecommunications service (as per Option 2)
- Simultaneously forbear from applying most requirements of Title II, other than those required to achieve stated policy goals

#### Level 1

#### Potential Third Way Obligations

- Impact of obligations that the FCC is explicitly considering in the NoI:
  - Introduction of formal complaint process and case-by-case analysis of practices **increases G&A costs**
  - Extension of **USF** adds contribution cost to broadband revenues and creates an opportunity to receive funding for broadband
  - FCC may impose an **obligation to resell** broadband access at regulated rates; causes a share of end-users to be **lost to wholesale** at a reduced revenue

#### Level 2

#### Obligations disclaimed by Chairman

- Further Title II obligations may be imposed over time should forbearance be lifted by FCC or courts
  - **Retail price regulation** reduces operator ARPUs
  - Extension of **Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS)** adds contribution cost to broadband
  - **Network Unbundling** causes share of end-users to be served through wholesale at cost-plus revenue

*Note: Likely regulatory actions were identified by TIA analysis – CSMG assessed the economic impacts of these*





# We considered the potential financial impact stemming from the two levels of regulation

	Level 1 Obligations	Level 2 Obligations
Primary Regulations Evaluating	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formal complaints process</li> <li>• CPNI</li> <li>• “Just and Reasonable” rates, terms and conditions</li> <li>• USF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resale at regulated rates</li> </ul>
Financial Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased admin and support costs                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 5% increase to care costs</li> <li>– 5% increase to SG&amp;A costs</li> </ul> </li> <li>• USF contribution of \$1.40/month (potentially offset by USF support in some limited cases)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resale obligations cause 40% of retail subs to be lost to other service providers through</li> <li>• Resold lines are broadband only (no TV and voice)</li> <li>• Wholesale rate is 91% of retail</li> </ul>
Rationale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional costs in complying with regulation and processing claims</li> <li>• USF contribution based on USF fund size staying constant, but with levy now distributed across telephony and broadband lines</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Benchmarked to European wholesale bitstream services (e.g. BT IPstream)</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retail rate regulation</li> <li>• TRS contribution</li> <li>• Network unbundling</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retail rate regulation reduces retail broadband ARPU by 10%</li> <li>• TRS contribution \$1.60/quarter</li> <li>• Network unbundling as per resale, but revenue lower at 41% of retail ARPU</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TRS methodology as per USF</li> <li>• Unbundling impact modeled as “virtual unbundling” – a cost-oriented bitstream access product benchmarked to BT Openreach pricing for NGA services</li> </ul>



To understand the effect of the increased regulatory burden CSMG modeled two operator business cases, each looking at a specific investment decision

### Cable Overbuild

- Investment case for cable build out
- Triple-play retail services including broadband Internet access
- Hybrid Fiber-Coax architecture with single fiber head-end for service area
- Allocation of central costs for SG&A and customer care

### FTTH Deployment

- Investment case to deploy FTTH
- Triple-play retail services including broadband Internet access
- GPON architecture
- Allocation of central costs for SG&A and customer care

For each business, the investment decision is tested in two different market scenarios to examine how the regulation would impact different populations



To examine the impact on investment in cable networks, CSMG modeled a build by an existing cable provider into a new geographic area

- Two markets are considered – a Rural Town and a Rural area
- Markets with geographic profiles similar to those used in our analysis provided as examples

### Market: Rural Town

- Population: 72,000 people
- Land area: 120 square miles
- Population density: 600 per square mile
- Example market:
  - Lima, Ohio
  - Local cable provider monthly offers range from 256 kbps (\$29.99) to 5 Mbps (\$140 )
  - HDTV not available

### Market: Rural

- Population: 24,000 people
- Land area: 400 square miles
- Population density: 60 per square mile
- Example market:
  - Forsythe, Georgia
  - Local cable provider offers up to 1 Mbps internet access for \$40
  - HDTV not available


### HFC Cable Overbuild Model

- Assumed to be extension by existing operator into new geographic area
- 10 year cash-flow model
- Investment case for cable build out
- Triple-play retail services including broadband Internet access
- Hybrid Fiber-Coax architecture with single fiber head-end for service area
- Expansion limited to a single market
- Only consumer market considered; business not modeled
- Allocation of central costs for SG&A and customer care




The impact of increased regulation causes the Rural Town cable model to not breakeven; the rural case has greater losses with the obligations imposed

**Cumulative FCF: Rural Town Case**



	Cumulative FCF (Year 10, \$M)
Base case	2.7
With Level 1 regulation	-12.5
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-16.7


**Cumulative FCF: Rural Case**



	Cumulative FCF (Year 10, \$M)
Base case	-9.7
With Level 1 regulation	-17.5
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-19.0



# Increasing the regulatory burden significantly reduces the Net Present Value (NPV) of both investment cases



Comments
<p><b>Rural Town</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Rural Town business case is profitable in the base case</li> <li>• However, the NPV with the regulatory impact makes the investment not viable</li> </ul> <p><b>Rural</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The rural business case is not profitable under any scenario, and would require USF support</li> <li>• The amount of support needed increases as the regulatory burden grows</li> </ul>



For the FTTH investment analysis, CSMG modeled the economics of an ILEC deploying an FTTH network to an area with existing DSL and voice services

- Two cases are considered – an urban market and a rural town market – with population and land area data from the US Census and CSMG’s own wirecenter database

### Urban Wirecenter Example

- Population: 58,000 people
- Land area: 50 square miles
- Population density: 1,160 per square mile
- Fiber miles: 11.8 miles
- Example market: Galveston, Texas

### Rural Town Wirecenter Example

- Population: 29,000 people
- Land area: 111 square miles
- Population density: 260 per square mile
- Fiber miles: 9.6 miles
- Example market: Cedar Valley, Texas




### CSMG FTTH Overbuild Model

- Investment case to deploy FTTH in a single CO with existing DSL and telephony service
- 10 year cash flow model
- Triple-play retail services including broadband Internet access
- GPON architecture
- Only incremental revenues and costs of deployment are included




The Level 1 regulatory regime causes the urban FTTH CO to shift from 10 year cash flow positive to negative; the rural town case becomes more loss-making

**Cumulative FCF: Urban Case**



	Cumulative FCF
Base case	\$6.3M
With Level 1 regulation	-\$7.7M
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-\$11.4M

**Cumulative FCF: Rural Town Case**




	Cumulative FCF
Base case	-\$9.3M
With Level 1 regulation	-\$16.3M
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-\$18.5M



Introducing Level 1 regulation causes the urban case to be financially unviable without government subsidies

### Impact of Regulation on Net Present Value



#### Comments

##### Urban

- The combined effect of higher operating expenses and lower revenue from forced resale associated with Level 1 regulation causes NPV to turn negative

##### Rural Town

- Lower household density necessitates additional CapEx in the form of feeder and distribution fiber and offers fewer subscribers to recoup those costs through additional revenue





- Executive Summary


- Cable Business Case

- – Overview
  - Base case results
  - Regulatory impact
- FTTH Business Case
- Regulatory Impact



The cable investment case models a Hybrid Fiber-Coax (HFC) network, with single Headend serving the entire coverage area


### HFC Network Architecture





The cable business case models the investment cost and payback of deploying a new HFC cable network in a Rural Town and Rural market

**Cable Business Model Overview**





- Executive Summary
- Cable Business Case
  - Overview
  - – Base case results
  - Regulatory impact
- FTTH Business Case
- Regulatory Impact



# Cable Business Case: Demand, Revenue and Financial Inputs

Demand	Rural Town	Rural
<b>Customer Base</b>		
Homes in market	30,000	10,000
Final penetration of subscriber served (Broadband)	42%	
Final penetration of subscriber served (Voice)	50% falling to 19%	
Final penetration of subscriber served (Video)	30%	
5 year subscribers reached	15,000	5,000
Coverage area (square miles)	120	400

Population in market	72,000	24,000
Population density (pops per square mile)	600	60

Churn	2% per month	
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Revenue	Rural Town	Rural
<b>Retail ARPU</b>		
Broadband revenue per subscriber	\$33; CAGR: 0.3%	
Voice revenue per subscriber	\$41; CAGR: -2.5%	
Video revenue per subscriber	\$76; CAGR: 2.2%	

Note: Each cable ARPU is assumed to be 10% lower than the respective FTTH ARPU

Source
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CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG
Calculation
CSMG

CSMG
CSMG


JP Morgan, CSMG
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SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG




Revenues closely track subscriber numbers; a small increase in blended ARPU is expected over 10 years

Subscribers and Revenue: Rural Town Case



Subscribers and Revenue: Rural Case



- The demand curve assumes a slower initial ramp, followed by more rapid adoption in the middle phase, tapering off from years 5-10



# Cable Business Case: Key CapEx Inputs


CAPEX		Rural Town	Rural
<b>Fixed</b>			
Head-end		\$3.3M	\$3.3M
<b>Semi-variable</b>			
Fiber	Fiber length (miles)	77	141
	Cost of fiber (\$ per foot)	\$1.25	\$1.25
	Cost of digging (\$ per foot)	\$4.95	\$8.95
	<b>Total Fiber Cost</b>	<b>\$2.5M</b>	<b>\$7.6M</b>
Optical Node + Coax	Cable length (miles)	300	540
	Cost of commercial coax (\$ per foot)	\$2.00	\$2.00
	Node Equipment Cost	\$30K	\$30K
	Nodes required	60	20
	<b>Total Optical Node + Coax Cost</b>	<b>\$11M</b>	<b>\$26M</b>
<b>Fully variable</b>			
Drop and Installation (per home connected)		\$240	\$240
CPE (per home connected)		\$120	\$120

Source
Bread, CSMG
Bread, CSMG
CSMG
Bread, CSMG
Bread, CSMG
JW Hardy, CSMG
Bread, CSMG
Bread, CSMG
Bread, CSMG
Pace Micro (IMS Research, 2008), CSMG




## Cumulative CapEx is higher in the Rural case due to the greater distances involved

*Cumulative CapEx: Rural Town Case*



- 60 nodes required
- 250 subscribers per node
- After non-variable CapEx costs in Year 1, CapEx is driven by subscriber connections

*Cumulative CapEx: Rural Case*



- 20 nodes required
- 250 subscribers per node
- The rural model has fewer subscribers, so requires fewer nodes, but the route miles and hence construction costs are increased





## Cable Business Case: Key OpEx Inputs

COGS	Rural Town	Rural
<b>Cost as a percentage of revenue</b>		
Programming Costs	23%	
Direct Costs	4%	

Source
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG

OPEX	Rural Town	Rural
<b>Cost as a percentage of revenue</b>		
Marketing Costs	4%	
Gen and Admin Costs	17%	
<b>Costs driven by subscriber numbers</b>		
Technical Costs (\$ / sub / month)	\$10.09	
Customer Service Costs (\$ / sub / month)	\$8.42	


Source
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG

- Unit operational costs assumptions are consistent across the Rural Town and Rural deployments
- However, operational costs are driven by subscriber numbers and revenues, and so are higher in absolute terms in the Rural Town deployment




OpEx is lower in the Rural case due to the lower number of subscribers; cost of goods sold is the largest expense

Cumulative 10 Year OpEx: Rural Town Case



Cumulative 10 Year OpEx : Rural Case



- COGS principally comprises programming
- Technical costs are network operating costs
- Marketing costs are 4% of in year revenue, and include above the line and below the line marketing
- Customer care includes the full cost of care for retail and wholesale subs (when applicable)
- Other G&A is calculated at 16% of revenue and includes administrative functions, property lease costs, etc.




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


Under resale and unbundling obligations, we assume 40% of cable subscribers are served via wholesale

Subscribers: Rural Town Case with Regulation



Subscribers: Rural Case with Regulation




- Obligations in level 1 and 2 regulation may require MSOs to sell wholesale capacity on their networks
- The total number of subscribers is constant across all cases
  - In the base cases, all subscribers are retail subs
  - Under Level 1 regulation, the 40% are modeled as resale customers
  - Under Level 2 regulation, the 40% are modeled as unbundled customers




# Obligations to wholesale network access reduce operator revenues by about one-third

Annual Revenue: Rural Town Case



Annual Revenue: Rural Case



	Year 1	Year 5	Year 10	Cumulative
Level 1 revenue impact	\$270K	-\$5.9M	-\$6.9M	-\$49M
Level 2 revenue impact	-\$295K	-\$6.6M	-\$7.7M	-\$55M


	Year 1	Year 5	Year 10	Cumulative
Level 1 revenue impact	-\$90K	-\$2.0M	-\$2.3M	-\$16M
Level 2 revenue impact	-\$98K	-\$2.2M	-\$2.6M	-\$18M

- Regulated wholesale access reduces average revenue per subscriber from \$97 in year 10 of the base case
  - Blended ARPU under Level 1 (resale) falls to \$62
  - Blended ARPU under Level 2 (unbundling) is \$58



# Additional regulation increases OpEx share of revenue by up to 14 percentage points

*OpEx as a % of Revenue: Rural Town and Rural Cases*




- Major components of the OpEx increase include:
  - Increased administrative and customer care costs due to formal complaint process, CPNI obligations, and USF administration
  - USF contribution per sub
  - TRS contribution per sub




The impact of increased regulation causes the Rural Town cable model to not breakeven; the rural case has greater losses with the obligations imposed

**Cumulative FCF: Rural Town Case**



**Cumulative FCF: Rural Case**




	Cumulative FCF (Year 10, \$M)
Base case	2.7
With Level 1 regulation	-12.5
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-16.7

	Cumulative FCF (Year 10, \$M)
Base case	-9.7
With Level 1 regulation	-17.5
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-19.0



Increasing the regulatory burden significantly reduces the Net Present Value (NPV) of both investment cases



Comments
<p><b>Rural Town</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Rural Town business case is profitable in the base case</li> <li>• However, the NPV with the regulatory impact makes the investment not viable</li> </ul> <p><b>Rural</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The rural business case is not profitable under any scenario, and would require USF support</li> <li>• The amount of support needed increases as the regulatory burden grows</li> </ul>






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
The FTTH model represents a passive optical network platform providing telephony, video and high speed internet services



<b>COST COMPONENT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OLT</li> <li>• Backbone (allocation)</li> <li>• CO Labor (installation)</li> <li>• Other CO Equipment (passive and active components)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feeder and Distribution Fiber Costs</li> <li>• Feeder and Distribution Fiber Labor Costs</li> <li>• Passive Optical Components</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drop Fiber Cost</li> <li>• Drop Fiber Installation Cost</li> <li>• ONT</li> <li>• Broadband Modem Cost</li> </ul>
<b>COSTS VARY BY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Homes per CO</li> <li>• Subscribers per CO</li> <li>• Labor and equipment cost/efficiency improvement over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Length of feeder and distribution fibers</li> <li>• Extent of buried vs. aerial plant</li> <li>• Labor and equipment cost/efficiency improvement over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Length of drop (housing lot size)</li> <li>• Installation efficiencies</li> <li>• Labor and equipment cost reductions</li> </ul>



We built a ten year revenue, capital and operating cost profile for each CO in order to evaluate the business case for FTTH on a case by case basis





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# FTTH business case: key revenue and demand assumptions

Demand	
<b>Household penetration (Per CO)</b>	
Voice services (subs saved through FTTH deployment)	5% of households “saved” moving to 10% “saved” in Y10
TV services (market share) <sup>1</sup>	25% in Y5, 35% in Y10
Broadband services (DSL cannibalization)	33% in Y5; 42% in Y10

Source
CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG

Revenue	
<b>ARPU<sup>2</sup></b>	
Voice ARPU	\$45 (2.5% decrease pa)
TV ARPU	\$85 (2.2% increase pa)
Data ARPU	\$37 (0.3% increase pa)

Source
SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG
SNL Kagan, CSMG


1 Assume that over time FTTH TV gains share from cable

2 Note: Individual service ARPUs are based on service revenue divided by # of RGUs. Because each subscribing HH has > 2 RGUs, blended ARPU is less than the sum of service ARPUs




# CSMG calculated the incremental revenue from FTTH over the existing DSL service

*Subscribers and Revenue: Urban Case*



*Subscribers and Revenue: Rural Town Case*



- Revenue is incremental based on increased ARPU over DSL ARPU and increased subscribers by preventing share loss to cable providers and incremental coverage of FTTH over DSL
- Incremental revenue of \$11.8M per year in urban case and additional 7.8K subscribers
- Implied ARPU of c. \$126 per incremental subscriber



# FTTH business case: key CapEx assumptions

CapEx	
<b>Feeder &amp; Distribution Costs</b>	
Cost per foot of fiber, buried	\$11
Cost per foot of fiber, aerial	\$3

Source
Cook Report, Verizon, Bread, CSMG
Gates Foundation, CSMG

Costs to Pass & Connect	
Cost to Pass, 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile <sup>1</sup>	\$700
Cost to Pass, 50 <sup>th</sup> – 75 <sup>th</sup> Percentiles	\$1,300
Cost to Connect	~\$650


CSMG, Verizon, others from 2008 FTTH council papers
Industry benchmark
Industry benchmark

1 Calculated as the weighted average cost to pass the 50% of HHs in the most densely populated CO territories




## Higher household density and shorter distances to homes lower CapEx in the urban case

*Cumulative CapEx : Urban Case*



*Cumulative CapEx : Rural Town Case*



- CapEx in the urban model is significantly lower due to shorter lengths per household
- 23,821 households
- 2.0M feet of fiber
- \$12.4M in feeder and distribution costs

- CapEx is high in the suburban model due to the lower household density
- 10,990 households
- 1.8M feet of fiber
- \$18.9M in feeder and distribution costs





## FTTH Business Case: Key OpEx Inputs

COGS	Urban	Rural Town
<b>Cost as a Percentage of Revenue</b>		
Programming Costs	23%	
Direct Costs	4%	

Source
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG

OPEX	Urban	Rural Town
<b>Cost as a Percentage of Revenue</b>		
Marketing Costs	4%	
Gen and Admin Costs	17%	
<b>Costs driven by subscriber numbers</b>		
Technical Costs (\$ / sub / month)	\$9.01 (10% lower than Cable due to infrastructure savings)	
Customer Service Costs (\$ / sub / month)	\$8.42	


Source
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG
Morgan Stanley, CSMG

- Utilised the same COGS and OPEX assumptions as in the cable business case
- Unit operational costs assumptions are consistent across the urban and rural town deployments
- However, operational costs are driven by subscriber numbers and revenues, and so are higher in absolute terms in the urban deployment




OpEx is lower in the rural town case due to the lower number of subscribers; cost of goods sold is the largest expense in the urban case driven by programming costs

*Cumulative 10 Year OpEx: Urban Case*



*Cumulative 10 Year OpEx : Rural Town Case*



COGS and OPEX are based on cost structure of similar cable businesses, however technical costs are 10% cheaper in the FTTH case than in the cable case as a result of savings from the FTTH architecture

- COGS principally comprises programming, with some other direct costs
- Marketing costs are 4% of in year revenue, and include above the line and below the line marketing
- Customer care includes the full cost of care for retail and wholesale subs (when applicable)
- Other G&A is calculated at 16% of revenue and includes administrative functions, lease costs, etc.




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


Under resale and unbundling obligations, we assume 40% of FTTH subscribers are served via wholesale

Subscribers: Urban Case with Regulation



Subscribers: Rural Town Case with Regulation




- Obligations in level 1 and 2 regulation may require MSOs to sell wholesale capacity on their networks
- The total number of subscribers is constant across all cases
  - In the base cases, all subscribers are retail subs
  - Under Level 1 regulation, the 40% are modeled as resale customers
  - Under Level 2 regulation, the 40% are modeled as unbundled customers




# Obligations to wholesale network access reduce operator revenues by over one-third

Revenue: Urban Case



Revenue: Rural Town Case




	Year 1	Year 5	Year 10	Cumulative
Level 1 Revenue impact	-\$650K	-\$2.7M	-\$4.1M	-\$26M
Level 2 Revenue impact	-\$1.1M	-\$3.4M	-\$5.1M	-\$33M

	Year 1	Year 5	Year 10	Cumulative
Level 1 Revenue impact	-\$320K	-\$1.3M	-\$2.0M	-\$13M
Level 2 Revenue impact	-\$560K	-\$1.7M	-\$2.6M	-\$17M

- Regulated wholesale access reduces average revenue per subscriber from \$126 in year 10 of the base case
  - Blended ARPU under Level 1 (resale) falls to \$82
  - Blended ARPU under Level 2 (unbundling) is \$71



## Additional regulation increases OpEx share of revenue by up to 11 percentage points




- Major components of the OpEx increase include:
  - Increased administrative and customer care costs due to formal complaint process, CPNI obligations, and USF administration
  - USF contribution per sub
  - TRS contribution per sub




The Level 1 regulatory regime causes the urban FTTH CO to shift from 10 year cash flow positive to negative; the rural town case becomes more loss-making

**Cumulative FCF: Urban Case**



**Cumulative FCF: Rural Town Case**




	Cumulative FCF
Base case	\$6.3M
With Level 1 regulation	-\$7.7M
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-\$11.4M

	Cumulative FCF
Base case	-\$9.3M
With Level 1 regulation	-\$16.3M
With Level 1 and 2 regulation	-\$18.5M



# Introducing Level 1 regulation causes the urban case to be financially unviable without government subsidies

**Impact of Regulation on Net Present Value**



Comments
<p><b>Urban</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The combined effect of higher operating expenses and lower revenue from forced resale associated with Level 1 regulation causes NPV to turn negative</li> </ul>
<p><b>Rural Town</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lower household density necessitates additional CapEx in the form of feeder and distribution fiber and offers fewer subscribers to recoup those costs through additional revenue</li> </ul>





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## OpEx Impact of Level 1 Regulatory Obligations

Assumption Category	Impacted By	Assumption	Rationale
<b>Customer care</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formal Complaint Process (Section 208)</li> <li>• CPNI (Section 222)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New customer complaints procedure results in 5% increase in customer care costs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSMG assumption</li> </ul>
<b>SG&amp;A costs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Just and reasonable” rates, terms, conditions could open door to case by case analysis of practices (Section 201)</li> <li>• USF contribution will require additional administrative support (Section 254)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New accounting and administrative procedures results in 5% increase in miscellaneous SG&amp;A costs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSMG assumption</li> </ul>
<b>USF contribution and support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USF contribution of \$1.40 per month applied to broadband customers (Section 254)</li> <li>• USF support calculated for the rural case in both cable and FTTH (Section 254)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USF contribution of \$1.40 per month applied to broadband customers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Calculated based on size of fund staying constant but revenue generating units increasing. Source: FCC, USAC, IDC</li> </ul>



## Revenue Impact of Level 1 Regulatory Obligations

Assumption Category	Impacted By	Assumption	Rationale
<b>Retail / Wholesale customer mix</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resale at regulated rates (Sections 201, 202)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>40% of customer base become resale lines</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSMG assumption based on international benchmarks (BT and France Telecom)</li> </ul>
<b>Resale ARPU</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resale at regulated rates (Sections 201, 202)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>91% of retail broadband ARPU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assumes that the resold product would be access only, and wholesale subscribers would provision video and telephony services from other providers; margin calculated based on international wholesale data service pricing versus retail pricing</li> </ul>



## Revenue and OpEx Impact of Level 2 Regulatory Obligations

Assumption Category	Impacted By	Assumption	Rationale
<b>ARPU</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Retail price regulation (Section 201)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10% decrease in blended ARPU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSMG assumption</li> </ul>
<b>Telecoms Relay Service contributions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Telecommunications Relay Service (Section 225)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>\$1.60 per quarter applied to broadband customers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Calculated based on size of fund staying constant but revenue generating units increasing</li> </ul>
<b>Unbundling</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Network unbundling (Section 251)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unbundled ARPU is 41% of retail broadband ARPU</li> <li>After mandating of resale, 40% of customer base are resale customers, and 60% are retail customers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ARPU based on international wholesale data service pricing versus retail pricing</li> <li>Customer split CSMG assumption based on international benchmarks</li> </ul>



There are other potential regulations that have not been quantified in this study due to the level of uncertainty regarding likely form and impact on broadband service providers

### Regulations that have not been explicitly modeled

- Disability Access (sec. 255)
- Public safety obligations (secs. 201,202,706)
- Network Neutrality Requirements (secs. 201,202)
- Physical interconnection (secs. 201, 202)
- Truth in Billing (secs. 201, 258)
- Entry / Discontinuance / Transfer of Control Limitations (sec. 214)
- Tariffing (sec. 203)
- Accounting Mandates (sec. 220,221)
- State regulation (sec. 152(b), 253)



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